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NOTES
THE PROCEDURAL MIRAGE:
POST-HOLL SUMMARY JUDGMENT LAW IN FLORIDA
The recent history of Florida's summary judgment rule disclosed a judicial

attitude diametrically opposed to the enthusiasm with which the procedure
was originally received. 2 A study of 421 Florida appellate decisions rendered
since 1967 reveals that 81.2 per cent of all appealed summary judgments have
been reversed, at least in part,3 thereby prolonging litigation and adding to
litigants' expense and delay.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, derived from Federal Rule 56,4
governs Florida summary judgments; its function is simply to provide for
1. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510. The operative section of the rule is §1.510(c), which is set forth

in full in the text accompanying note 16 infra.
2. The summary judgment is a relatively recent addition" to the attorney's procedural
arsenal. It was first introduced in England in 1855 primarily to help plaintiffs overcome
sham pleadings and delay by defendants. When the device was first introduced in New York

in 1921 initial response was highly favorable; by 1940 a New York jurist proclaimed that
"this summary remedy is working exceedingly well." D. SHmENTAG, SuMMARY JuDGEmENT 104
(1941). It was believed that parties would no longer attempt to advance feigned issues because the "repressive" character of the rule would render them futile. In this way the rule
would discourage perjury and would facilitate early settlements. Id. at 3. In blunt contrast
with this initial reaction to the device, Florida commentators in 1972 observed: "Summary

judgments are generally not a favored device for terminating litigation in Florida." Massey
& Klock, Civil Procedure,Tenth Survey of FloridaLaw, 26 U. MiAmi L. Ray. 470, 547 (1972).
3. The full statistical results of the study are presented in tabular form in the Appendix. As indicated in the text, the compilation includes as "reversals" those cases where
summary judgments were reversed in part; the result, of course, is to make the percentage
reversal figures slightly higher. Because in these cases the partial reversals meant that final
adjudication had not been accomplished through use of the summary judgment device, therefore prolonging the litigation in the same manner as in cases wherein reversal was "total,"
it is submitted that the figures as presented do not represent a statistical distortion.
Multiple and mixed holdings in these decisions also account for the fact that some of the
numerical and percentage totals will not always balance. The use of this form in presentation of the results is to emphasize the obvious statistical lesson that emerges from this study:
an overwhelming majority of summary judgments in Florida do not succeed and provide the
movant with only temporary, hence illusory, relief.
The body of cases studied is so great as to render presentation of all the cases in tabular
form in an appendix both unwieldy and unreadable. Citations in the footnotes are designed
to provide a cross-section of all cases studied sufficient to reflect accurately-the trends contained therein as indicated in summary form in the Appendix.
Undoubtedly the 421 cases do not comprise all the summary judgment decisions handed
down since the appearance of volume 200 of the Southern Reporter, 2d series, which was
selected as an arbitrary starting point for the study. Although a few cases undoubtedly
escaped the sweep of the author's net, the cases compiled unquestionably represent the vast
majority of decisions over the approximate seven-year period involved. The statistics are
therefore submitted with a high degree of confidence in their accuracy.
4. FLORIDA CIvIL PRArICE BEFoRE TRIAL, Summary Judgment §19.5 (Fla. Bar Continuing
Legal Educ. Practice Manual No. 11, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Sumrmary Judgment].
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early resolution of litigation where no questions of fact existA Theoretically,
the device serves the purpose of expeditiously settling the interests of the
parties and reducing the litigation load in the trial docket.6 It is an open
question, however, what purposes the summary judgment serves in fact if it so
often results in reversal. Despite the overwhelming likelihood of reversal if
appealed, counsel and trial courts continually resort to the summary judgment,
sometimes with disastrous results. In the leading modern Florida case on the
subject, Holl v. Talcott7 defendants in a medical malpractice action won
summary judgment at the trial court and affirmance at the district court of
appeal.8 This victory was reversed by the supreme court, however, and after a
subsequent trial, plaintiffs won a verdict and judgment for S1.5 million, a
result affirmed by the same district court that had originally approved defendants' summary judgment. 9 Other less dramatic cases with the same basic
outcome are abundant. 10 The statistics demonstrate that in more than four
out of every five cases relief by summary judgment is short-lived. They indicate
that the device has been misused and misunderstood by trial courts and
counsel to the extent that it is becoming less useful to deserving parties. The
inescapable conclusion is that rule 1.510, as applied by Florida courts in recent
years, presents merely an attractive mirage to civil litigants."
5. See Massey & Klock, supra note 2, at 547, citing Page v. Staley, 226 So. 2d 129 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1969), wherein the court enumerated three purposes of a summary judgment: (1)
to determine whether evidence exists to justify trial on issues raised in the pleadings, (2) to
expedite litigation, and (3) to reduce expense.
6. Cf. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010: "'[T]o secure the just, speed), and inexpensive determination"
of the action. See Stephens v. Dichtenmueller, 216 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 1968) (Drew, J., concurring specially); Ham v. Heintzelman's Ford, Inc., 256 So. 2d 264, 267 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
7. 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966). Statistics were not kept on the number of times Holl was
cited in the 421 cases examined in this study. It is estimated by the author, however, that it
is cited twice as often as any other recent case on the subject in Florida. Of importance to
the general subject of summary judgments is the fact that Holl emerged from the factual
matrix of a medical malpractice action, a class that comprises a very small proportion of
summary judgment decisions; significantly, it is often cited as authority in cases dealing with
areas of law well removed from the milieu of malpractice. E.g., Travel Internationale, Ltd. v.
Batchelor, 234 So. 2d 648, 649 (Fla. 1970) (action for, inter alia, inducement to lease through
misrepresentation and breach of contract); Stringfellow v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 295
So. 2d 686 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974) (reversal of summary judgment for defendant-insurer on
question of effectiveness of insurance coverage of defendant-insurer); 'Wagner v. Bonucelli,
239 So. 2d 619, 620 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (summary judgment for plaintiff-payee on demand
note reversed).
8. Holl v. Talcott, 171 So. 2d 412 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
9. Talcott v. Holl, 224 So. 2d 420 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
10. E.g., Mendez v. Blackburn, 226 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1969); Butler v. Porter-Russell Corp.,
217 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1968); Stephens v. Dichtenmueller, 216 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1968); MacArthur
v. Gaines, 286 So. 2d 608 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Blank v. Yoo-Hoo of Florida Corp., 222 So.
2d 420 (Fla. 1969).
11. Further difficulty is posed by the wide disparity of treatment given summary judgments in various cases by the Florida appellate courts. Countless decisions merely recite the
incantation that the movant for summary judgment has not demonstrated conclusively the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Hudson v. Fatolitis, 289 So. 2d 41 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Graham v. First Marion Bank, 237 So. 2d 793 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Tyler
v. Gulf Coast Rd. & Equip. Co., 227 So. 2d 547 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); McClendon v. Key, 209
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Accordingly, this note examines in depth recent developments in Florida
summary judgment law. Within a statistical framework, 12 an extensive examination of judicial interpretations and limitations of rule 1.510(c) is followed by discussion of the use of summary judgment in the major areas of
negligence litigation and actions arising ex contractu. The functions and
perspectives of counsel, trial courts, and appellate courts in summary adjudication are analyzed, concluding with suggestions for counsel to consider
13
in deciding whether and when to move for summary judgment.
THE FOCAL POINT: THE DUAL REQUIEIMENT OF RULE 1.510(c)

The rules governing summary judgments are straightforward and simple.14
Nevertheless, three basic problems recur in summary judgment law over the
period studied. These are the definitions governing the basic requirements of
the rule, the pervasive influence of two major decisions, 5 and confusion over
the burdens placed on parties moving for and opposing summary judgment.
Timing considerations compound the problem.
Threshold and DefinitionalProblems
A party moving for summary judgment must meet a twofold requirement:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admission on file together
with the affidavits [in support or opposition, or both] if any, show [1]
So. 2d 273 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968), while others exhaustively sort and analyze the issues for
trial, as in Mackey v. Arnold, 242 So. 2d. 754 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970). Compare Rosenberg v.
Bank of Commerce, 256 So. 2d 17 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971), with Varnadoe v. Desoto Canning
Co., 256 So. 2d 226 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972). See text accompanying notes 168-170 infra.
12. See Appendix. While the 421 cases studied for the purposes of this Note do not
comprise an exhaustive collection of summary judgment decisions since 1967, they do constitute the substantial majority of summary judgment cases since that time, indicating that
the statistical conclusions drawn therefrom are substantially accurate. The limited resources
of the author also precluded collection of data on unappealed summary judgments (although it seems likely there are few of these), and on denials of motions for summary
judgment at the trial court level. Given these limitations, however, the size of the statistical
sample lends sufficient weight to the conclusions reached.
13. Conversely, suggestions for attacking summary judgment will be presented concurrently.
14. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.510. The essential dual requirement, enumerated in §1.510(c), see
text accompanying note 16 infra, is the focus of most of the appellate decisions. This will
also be the primary focus in the discussion below. See text accompanying notes 16-107 infra.
The apparent simplicity of the rule often leads courts merely to reiterate elementary matters
on the subject without adding anything new. See, e.g., Egan v. Washington Gen. Ins. Corp.,
240 So. 2d 875, 878 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Knight v. American Heritage Life Ins. Co., 237
So. 2d 224, 225 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Fischer v. Bernard's Surf, 217 So. 2d 576 (4th D.C.A.
Fla. 1969); Tyner v. Woodruff, 206 So. 2d 684 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Hellweg v. Holmquist,
203 So. 2d 209 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
15. Visingardi v. Tirone, 193 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1966); Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
1966). The enormous influence of these cases is discussed in text accompanying notes 29-46
infra.
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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [2] that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 16
The movant, who must satisfy both prerequisites to obtain summary judgment, 17 is confronted with definitional difficulties concerning each.

The "genuine issue" requirement has generated considerable comment at
the appellate level; often the courts fail to define the term, as if it were quite
clear to counsel and courts exactly what constitutes a "genuine issue as to a
material fact," when the opposite is likely the case.', On occasion courts and
counsel fail at the outset to distinguish between a determination of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the one hand and an adjudication
of the facts on the other. 9 When a court engages in the latter, the "genuine
issue" requirement is bypassed altogether, and a remand is the result.
When reviewing courts do address themselves to the definitional question,
as in Byrd v. Leach, 20 the term "genuine issue" is defined descriptively as a
"real, as opposed to a false or colorable issue."211 Other courts have described
the term as meaning a "justiciable"22 or "triable"23 issue. Perhaps more helpful is the functional description that if the "slightest doubt" exists as to
presence of an issue of fact, then summary judgment cannot be granted. 24
Even where the trial court has before it all the evidence that will be adduced
at trial or final hearing, the genuine issue requirement may still be met so
long as there is a question for the trier of fact.2 The complexity of the facts
also generates judicial suspicion that genuine issues exist, therefore precluding
summary judgment.2r Aside from the "slightest doubt" and complexity tests,
however, it is apparent that the courts have developed no comprehensive
definition of the genuine issue requirement of section 1.510(c). This omission
is surprising, for section (c) is the heart of the summary judgment rule.
The term "material fact" has also proved elusive of concrete definition.
Presumably the standard evidentiary meaning is intended, but this assumption
is confirmed nowhere in the recent body of Florida case law. One court attempted to define the entire genuine issue requirement as "disputed issue of

16. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c); see Massey &Klock, supra note 2, at 547.
17. Nobles v. City of Jacksonville, 265 So. 2d 550 (1st D.C.A. 1972), cert. denied, 272 So.
2d 158 (Fla. 1973); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 213 So. 2d 741 (Ist
D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
18. Cf. Ham v. Heintzelman's Ford, Inc., 256 So. 2d 264, 267 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
19. Id. Sometimes the distinction is elusive and courts yield to the temptation to adjudicate. Compare Gentile v. Abadessa, 267 So. 2d 344 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972), with Lab v.
Hall, 200 So. 2d 556, 559 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967) (Andrews, J., dissenting).

20. 226 So. 2d 866 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969). This opinion contains a lucid collection of the
basic principles of summary judgment law.
21. Id. at 868.
22. Inland Rubber Corp. v. Helman, 237 So. 2d 291, 296 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
23. Mainor v. Hobbie, 238 So. 2d 499 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
24. Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 261 So. 2d 191, 193 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Cf. Pacific
Indem. Co. v. Pinellas County, 214 So. 2d 58, 60-61 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
25. Schollenberger v. Baskin, 227 So. 2d 79 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
26. 191 So. 2d at 46 (dictum).
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critical fact,"27 but this definition seems to collide with the slightest doubt
standard. It may be that ultimate definition of the term is impossible; at this
juncture in Florida summary law it is defined vaguely at best, and the definitional problem in all likelihood is a factor in the high reversal rate.
The Impact of Holl and Visingardi
Two medical malpractice actions decided in 1966 have exerted enormous
influence on the development of Florida summary judgment law.28 In both
Holl v. Talcott29 and Visingardi v. Tirone0 the respective trial courts had
stricken the plaintiffs' affidavits in opposition to defendants' motions for summary judgment, but the Florida supreme court reversed both decisions and
-emanded them for trial. The court'in H611 held, inter alia, that the burden
on parties mbving for summary judgmentis greater than that on plaintiff at
trial,- because' the movant must prove a negative -the nonexistence of a
genuine issue of material fact. 3 1 M6reover,: the *standardis that of conclusiveriess;32-the movant iaust remove all doubts as to the existence of any genuine
issue of material fact,33 although the text of the rule contains no such express
requirement.34 Until the movant conclusively demonstrates the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact, it is not necessary for the court to reach the
question of the legal sufficiency of any affidavits offered in opposition to the
motion. 35
In addition to imposing this high standard, the court in both cases appeared *to lower the criterion to be met by affidavits submitted in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment. The Holl court suggested in dictum that
the opposing party need not, in his opposing affidavit, "cover all the details
and formalities that would be required in offering the same experts' testimony
at... trial"36 lest the summary judgment process prematurely balloon into a
full-blown trial, rather than remain a search for the issues.37 The court added
in Visingardi that the provisions of rule 1.510(e), which requires that affidavits
submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, do not require the opposing party

27. Nichols v. Village Park Mobile Home Estates, Inc., 237 So. 2d 807 (2d D.C.A Fla.

1970).
28. Croft v. York, 244 So. 2d 161, 164 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1971); Grimes v. Holt, 225 So. 2d
566, 569 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1969); Grove v. Sanford Mobile Park, Inc., 212 So. 2d 34, 37 (4th
D.CA. Fla. 1968).
29. 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
30. 193 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1966).
31. 191 So.2d at 43.
32.

Id.

33. Id. at 48, citing Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1965).
34. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
35. 191 So. 2d at 43, 45. It should be noted, however, that rule 1.510 by its terms does
not require affidavits to be submitted in opposition to motions for summary judgment. FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
36. 191 So. 2d at 45.
37. Id.; see 193 So. 2d at 605.
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to "make out his whole case before his affidavit is admissible." 38 Although the
court in Visingardi was concerned primarily with the issue of sufficiency of
affidavits in opposition to motions for summary judgments, it complemented
Holl's imposition of a heavier burden on the movant by establishing a lesser
burden on the opposing party. There may have been previous Florida cases on
the general subject of the relation between the relative burdens of the parties, 39
but Holl and Visingardi were emphatic and exhaustive in their treatment and,
coming so close together, were bound to exert substantial influence on summary judgment law.
In studying and, more importantly, in utilizing post-Holl summary judgment law, one must remember that both opinions emerged from medical malpractice causes. And, as the Holl court noted, summary judgment procedures
are to be used with special care in negligence actions, particularly in malpractice cases. 40 Although the Holl court refrained from speculating on the
potential impact of its opinion on the body of summary judgment law in
general, 41 the impact clearly has been substantial. 42 It follows that a major
reason why summary judgments have met with such little success in Florida
in recent years is simply that these cases were decided in the context of an
area of substantive law - malpractice - which is rarely amenable to summary
adjudication.
The supreme court appeared to retreat from these exacting standards in
Travel Internationale,Ltd. v. Batchelor.43 The court affirmed summary judgment for a defendant who allegedly induced the plaintiff to enter an airplane
lease contract through misrepresentation, and then allegedly breached the
contract. Approving the course taken by the district court of appeal in testing
the genuine issue requirement simply by inquiring whether there was "undisputed fact, " 44 the trial court's finding that the "undisputed facts" presented
to it revealed no cause of action on behalf of the opposing party was considered by the supreme court tantamount to a finding that no genuine issues
of material fact existed. The court was convinced that its decision was in
harmony with HoUl4 5 and simply did not address itself to the issue of whether
movant had met its burden under the earlier case. Focusing on the court's decision, rather than its language, suggests that the high standard of Holl was not
applied. Nonetheless, Travel Internationale appears to be an aberration that

38. 193 So. 2d at 604.
39. Concerning the movant's burden to show conclusively the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact, see Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1965); cf. Matarese v.
Leesburg Elks Club, 171 So. 2d 606. 607 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
40. 191 So. 2d at 46.
41. Id.
42. See cases cited note 28 supra. The court in Kochan v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 200
So. 2d 213 (2d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1967), warned that Holl arising as
it did from a cause of action ex delicto, should have no bearing on cases arising ex contractu.
Id. at 220. The court's admonition has been ignored substantially.
43. 234 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1970).
44. Id. at 658.
45. Id.
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has not been followed. Holl and Visingardi should therefore be considered
intact in terms of their impact on Florida summary judgment law.
The Post-Holl Approach
The approach of post-Holl reviewing courts usually begins with an inquiry
whether a movant has satisfactorily met the burden of conclusively showing
the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.46 If it finds the movant has
not met this burden, reversal is automatic and it is not necessary for the court
to move to the second aspect of the inquiry - the question whether movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although there is no language in any
case making the point directly, the courts seem to view the dual requirement
as a two-step progression: a party will not be entitled to judgment as a matter
of law until he has proved the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. In
at least one instance, however, the First District Court of Appeal made no
mention of the inquiry into the existence of genuine issues of material fact and
reversed from the opposite direction by finding movant was not entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. In Nobles v. City of Jacksonville47 a
personal injury action, the court, after reciting the dual requirements of rule
1.510(c), went straight to the question of whether a municipal ordinance placed
a duty of care on various municipal officials responsible for maintenance of
the bridge on which the plaintiff had been injured. Finding that it had created
such a duty, the court reversed the summary judgment. The court did not
state whether the movant in this case had successfully met its burden of showing the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Nobles warns that even if
the "threshold" burden is met the movant is not automatically assured of an
affirmable summary judgment, emphasizing the additional requirement on the
movant to show his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
A comparison between a motion for summary judgment and one for directed verdict is helpful in delineating the scope of the dual requirement of
rule 1.510(c). 49 Although the former antedates trial while the latter occurs at
trial and after presentation of the evidence, the two motions are analogous in
that they will be granted only when no "questions of fact" remain and only
"questions of law" are left for adjudicationm But in the vast body of summary
46. E.g., Moore v. School Bd., 292 So. 2d 244 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Moody v. Seaboard
Coastline R.R., 287 So. 2d 707 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Krantz v. Donner, 285 So. 2d 699 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Goodman v. Anthony, 269 So. 2d 756 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
47. 265 So. 2d 550 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
48. Id. Even when the facts are stipulated and both parties are amenable to summary
adjudication, judgment will not be available unless the dual requirement is met. See text
accompanying notes 60-64 infra.
49. Summary Judgment, supra note 4, §19.3.
50. In one case it was held summary judgment would be granted if at trial a directed
verdict would be awarded. Locke v. Stuart, 113 So. 2d 402 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959). But denial
of the motion for summary judgment does not necessarily foreclose the direction of verdict
at trial. Summary Judgment, supra note 4, §19.3. Perhaps the distinguishing feature of the
motion is that it may be made at virtually any point along the procedural continuum short
of trial. See text accompaning notes 108-117 infra.
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judgment decisions handed down since Holl, no satisfactory explication of the
sometimes narrow distinction between questions of "fact" and "law" has been
formulated for the purpose of passing on the validity of summary judgments.5'
Thus, the matter is left for determination by trial courts on a case-by-case basis.
One test set forth in an older case 52 utilizes the distinction between
"evidentiary" facts and "ultimate" facts; the latter are the operative facts relating to the cause of action or defense, as the case may be, and may be in
dispute even when the basic or "evidentiary" facts ("what was done or said")
are not.5 3 The court did not equate "ultimate facts" with "material facts," but

this meaning clearly emerges. Therefore, for the purpose of summary judgment
the determination of the ultimate facts is for the trier of fact, so that even
when only questions of ultimate fact remain, the cause is not amenable to summary adjudication.5 4 This approach, however, has apparently been utilized very
little in recent years.
A related and far more frequently utilized technique is that of examining
the "inferences of fact reasonably deducible from [the] undisputed evidence." 55
Even when a material fact is not in dispute, summary judgment will be denied
if conflicting inferences emerge therefrom. 56 In one personal injury case, for
example, the evidence of a slippery floor caused by an oil slick was held by
the court to require one of two inferences, the latter of which would have
placed a duty of care on defendants.Y7 Because a genuine issue of material fact
51. The question of fact-question of law distinction is similar to the problem discussed
in the text accompanying notes 18-19 supra, concerning the difficulty experienced by some
courts in discerning fact adjudication and determination of the existence of factual issues.
52. National Airlines, Inc. v. Florida Equip. Co., 71 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1954).
53. Id. at 744. National Airlines was an action for breach of contract in which the
"evidentiary facts" of defendants' removal of old engines from plaintiffs' boat were undisputed. Plaintiff contended that this evidentiary fact, coupled with the evidentiary fact of a
signed order received by defendant, led to a finding of ultimate fact of defendants' acceptance of plaintiffs' offer. Id.
54. Id. The determination of the ultimate facts showing the formation of a contract was
held by the National Airlines court to be a matter "peculiarly within the province of the
jury." Id. But see Shafer & Miller v. Miami Heart Institute, 237 So. 2d 310 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1970), wherein the court, in a personal injury action, affirmed summary judgment for crossclaimant owner against co-defendant contractor, stating in part: "The trial judge correctly
held that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to ultimate fact that if liability existed for the injury that the liability existed because of an 'act or omission of the said
contractor.' It follows from the clear wording of the contract that as a matter of law the
appellee was entitled to the partial summary judgment upon liability." Id. at 311. The
court's treatment of "ultimate fact" seems to conflict directly with the term as used by the
supreme court in National Airlines. The confusion may have been compounded by the
court in Duprey v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 254 So. 2d 57 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1971), when it
cited Shafer & Miller as authority in affirming summary judgment for defendant-insurer. Still,
National Airlines has not been overruled and sets forth the correct rule. If this approach
is revived in summary judgment litigation, National Airlines should control and, in fact,
could help to clear up some of the current confusion concerning rule 1.510(c).
55. Tatman v. American Heritage Life Ins. Co., 215 So. 2d 11 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
56. Ham v. Heintzelman's Ford, Inc., 256 So. 2d 264, 267 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971); Herold
v. Computer Components Int'l, Inc., 252 So. 2d 576 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971); General Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Bent, 204 So. 2d 38, 41 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967) (Wigginton, J., dissenting).
57. Bars v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 222 So. 2d 445 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
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thus emerged, in terms of a conflict of deducible inferences, summary judgment for defendants was reversed. 58
Not infrequently both parties move for or indicate amenability to summary adjudication, presumably in most instances because they are convinced
only "questions of law" remain to be decided. In such instances, as where
counsel stipulate for the use of the summary judgment procedure, 9 the trial
court is not bound if genuine issues of material fact exist.A0 One case where
the reviewing court upheld summary judgment because "all parties were in
agreement concerning the material issues of fact"' 1 likely has little precedential
value because the opposing party attempted to amend her fact averments on
appeal in an effort to generate de novo a question of fact. Finally, if the subject matter of the case involves a new or uncharted area of law, agreement or
stipulation of the parties to summary adjudication will not suffice to prevent
reversal. In Van Arsdale v. Dimil Land Co.,62 a dispute concerning certain
rights to recently discovered mineral and petroleum deposits, the court, -citing
"critical unplumbed areas," remanded the case for trial on the merits. In spite
of the stipulated agreement of counsel to summary adjudication, the court
stated that there were disputed fact issues but stressed the need for a full trial
of the novel issues involved:
We feel that the conflicts in the testimony of the experts and the summary presentation does [sic] not afford an adequate basis for a definitive
treatment and judgment.
It is generally understood that in certain parts of Florida, at least,
there have been significant oil and mineral discoveries. Thus a careful
pronouncement in this case could do much to insure orderly development in future conveyancing.6 3
One may justifiably conclude that post-Holl reviewing courts are simply hostile
to summary judgments, and use a variety of techniques to defeat them.
Burdens on Moving and OpposingParties
The burden on the movant, substantial enough as set forth in the rule,6 4
has been described by the Holl court as even greater than that on plaintiff at
trial. While the plaintiff can win his case on the strength of the greater weight
of the evidence, the movant for summary judgment must show conclusively
that there are no genuine issues of material fact.65 The question of what is
conclusive for the purpose of meeting the burden has not been resolved clearly.
It apparently does not require that a movant exhaust all possible claims or
58. Id.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Schollenberger v. Baskin, 227 So. 2d 79 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
Van Arsdale v. Dimil Land Co., 264 So. 2d 85 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
Keller v. Penovich, 262 So. 2d 243, 244 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
264 So. 2d 85 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).

63. Id. at 86.

64. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
65. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966).
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defenses, although in Madison v. Haynes-6 summary judgment for plaintiff apparently was reversed for that very reason: plaintiff failed to negate the unlikely but possible affirmative defense of valid title in defendant's predecessor
in title. 67 The "conclusive" requirement does mandate that the reviewing court
draw all possible inferences in favor of the opposing party68 and means that if
such inferences are sufficient in themselves to indicate the existence of genuine
issues of material fact, the summary judgment will not be permitted to stand.6 9
Although the movant is technically not placed under the burden of excluding
every possible inference in favor of the opposing party, 70 the courts at times
seem to suggest that a movant meet that burden. 7 1 The court in Visingardi, in
fact, went so far as to spell out the inferable issues that the movant had failed
to foreclose and that thus dictated the reversal of summary judgment. 72
Even given the substantial burden placed on the moving party,' 3 the opposing party is nevertheless in no position passively to assume denial or reversal.74 Still, the "burden" does not "shift" to the opposing party until a
movant has conclusively met his task of proving the dual requirements of rule
1.510(c).75 In Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Manufacturing Co.76 the trial court, which
had ordered a new trial after finding that a jury verdict for plaintiff was not
supported by the evidence, granted summary judgment for defendants. Nonetheless, the district court of appeal reversed because genuine issues of material
fact remained unresolved, even though the plaintiff had been unable to meet
its evidentiary burden at trial."
s
When the burden does "shift"
to the opposing party, the courts are gen66. 220 So. 2d 44 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
67. Id. at 46.
68. Prestress Erectors, Inc. v. James Talcott, Inc., 213 So. 2d 296, 298 (3d D.C.A.), cert.
denied, 219 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1968).
69. See Greer v. Workman, 203 So. 2d 665 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
70. Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1965).
71. Tyner v. Woodruff, 206 So. 2d 684, 687 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
72. 193 So. 2d at 606.
73. 191 So. 2d at 40.
74. Matarese v. Leesburg Elks Club, 171 So. 2d 606, 607 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
75. Croft v. York, 244 So. 2d 161, 163-64 (Ist D.C.A.), cert. denied, 246 So. 2d 787 (Fla.
1971).
76. 261 So. 2d 191 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
77. Id. at 193. The court also invoked the "slightest doubt" test in assessing whether
movant had met the "conclusiveness" requirement.
78. There is some conflict whether the burden of "proof" "shifts," or whether the opposing party is under the somewhat less stringent duty to "come forward with the evidence"
in opposition to the motion. See text accompanying notes 88-93 infra. Perhaps the courts
would benefit by adopting the approach of one commentator who recognizes three distinct
burdens relating to the establishment of legal claims. The first is the burden of pleading
the facts required to establish a party's substantive claim or defense. The second is the
initial burden of producing evidence of the existence or nonexistence of the fact. The third
burden is that of persuading the factfinder of the existence or nonexistence of the fact.
K. HUGHES, EVIDENCE §23 (Massachusetts Practice vol. 19, 1961). Substituting the words
"genuine issues of material fact" for "fact" in the foregoing definition, it appears that a
movant's burden, as defined by Hoi, is that of persuasion - persuading the trial court of the
nonexistence of the genuine issue of material fact. According to this view the burden of
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erally amenable to denying (or reversing) summary judgment so long as the
opposing party can demonstrate existence of the "slightest doubt" as to issues
of material fact or inferences arising therefrom.79 Here again an aberrant decision confuses and contradicts the principle. In Lindsey v. Seaboard Coastline
Railroad Co.,80 a wrongful death action, the reviewing court affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant railroad, holding that inasmuch as it was
"extremely doubtful" that application of the train's emergency brakes would
have prevented the collision, the opposing party failed to meet her burden of
showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 81
Assuming a movant does meet his burden, and that the burden in fact
"shifts," the "paper issue" principle may defeat opposing parties who rely, for
example, merely on naked denial in the pleadings as the basis for claiming
existence of genuine issues of material fact.8 2 The cases make clear that the
party moved against may not "sit back and do nothing."8' 3 Nevertheless, the
courts generally adopt a minimal standard in testing the sufficiency of affidavits offered in opposition; ordinarily the opposing party need only establish the existence of evidence that meets the "slightest doubt" standard.8 4 In
Ham v. Heintzelman's Ford,Inc.,8 5 for example, a certificate of title containing
the legend "previously used in long-T lease" was held sufficient to generate a
genuine fact issue as to the question of alleged misrepresentation by defendant
over its claim that the document - which was plaintiff's sole evidence appended to his affidavit in opposition - violated the hearsay rule and "paper
issue" principle.8 8

persuasion does not shift. Thus, it would appear that the party opposing the motion is
under the second burden - that of producing evidence of the existence of genuine issues of
material fact. Although this view does not describe the quantum of evidence required to
meet this second burden, it is dear that in the summary judgment context it would be
considerably less than the burden of persuasion, as indicated in the text accompanying note

79 infra.
79. Fletcher v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 261 So. 2d 191, 193 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972); cf. Smith v.
Baker, 206 So. 2d 409 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
80. 248 So. 2d 518 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
81. Id. at 521. This case is also unusual in its approach to determining the validity of
the trial court's action in granting the summary judgment; the court seemed to accept without question the premise that movant-defendant had met its burden, and framed its inquiry
solely in terms of whether the plaintiff had established existence of any genuine issues of
material fact. In this regard it appears to be at variance with the requirement for review
implicitly set forth in Holl.
82. Kochan v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 200 So. 2d 213, 216 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); see
General Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bent, 204 So. 2d 38, 39 (1st D.C.A. la. 1967). But cf. Rinzler v.
Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 665 (Fla. 1972) (plaintiff's sworn complaint raised justiciable issue as
to physical possession of firearm in replevin action).
83. Matarese v. Leesburg Elks Club, 171 So. 2d 606, 607 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
84. Lampman v. City of North Miami, 209 So. 2d 273 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
85. 256 So. 2d 264 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
86. Id. at 268-69. The plaintiff relied on this certificate because a statute required that
automobile dealers who sold automobiles that had been leased previously were required to
so indicate on certificates of title by inserting the legend: "This motor vehicle has previously
been used under long-term lease." Id.
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The uncertainty that permeates this entire area of summary judgment law
extends even to the description of the "burdens" on moving and opposing
parties. Against Holl's flat assertion that movant carries a burden of proof
greater than that on plaintiff at trial but that the burden shifts to the opposing party once the movant has met it successfully 7 the court in Byrd v.
Leach 8s expressly stated that the burden does not shift to the opposing party
but that the opposing party must go forward with "evidence sufficient to generate an issue on a material fact."8' 9 This variance in descriptions by the courts
suggests a blurry delineation of the scope of the burden on the opposing party,
a problem that unquestionably contributes to the high reversal rate.90 Clearly,
a plaintiff need not prove all the elements of his case in opposition to a motion for summary judgment as he would in opposition to a motion for directed
verdict at trial.91 On the other hand, it is insufficient for a defendant seeking
to interpose an affirmative defense in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment merely to assert the defense in the pleadings. 92 It is not at all clear,
93
however, what is required of defendant beyond the level of pleadings.
The evidentiary requirements on the parties at the motion hearing provide
yet another area of uncertainty. By one view, when defendant moves for summary judgment the inquiry is whether, from the pleadings, depositions and
affidavits it has been shown conclusively that plaintiff cannot possibly prove
his case. 94 If there is a possibility, however remote, that plaintiff may be able
to adduce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie cause of action, the
courts will disallow summary judgment.95 "Critical" differences between the
depositions of opposing parties, by virtue of their generating "massive conflict,"
have been held sufficient to lift the case from the level of summary adjudication.9 6 There appears to be no set rule governing the extent to which reviewing
courts are bound by the pleadings, depositions, and answers to interrogatories
on which the order granting summary judgment is based. Accordingly, the
courts appear at times to strain to find genuine issues in the record when it is
87. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
88. 226 So. 2d 866 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
89. Id. at 868.
90. Unequivocal adoption of Professor Hughes' three-burden test would almost certainly
alleviate this difficulty; see note 78 supra.
91. 193 So. 2d at 605.
92. Tippett v. Frank, 238 So. 2d 671, 673 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
93. Compare Tippett v. Frank, 238 So. 2d 671 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970), with Haren v.
Sundie, 219 So. 2d 731 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). It should be noted, however, that rule 1.510(c)
does not require the submission of affidavits in support of or in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment. Because rule 1.510(a) permits the motion within 20 days of the filing of
the initial pleading by plaintiffs, and any time after commencement of the action in the
case of defendants, it is conceivable that summary judgment could be granted before the
pleading stage is complete, to say nothing of discovery. In theory, at least, summary judgment can be rendered on the pleadings alone.
94. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc. v. Patty, 109 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1959); Williams v.
Florida Realty & Management Co., 272 So. 2d 176 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
95. Charles Taylor Marine, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 234 So. 2d 400, 402 (3d
D.C.A.), cert. denied, 238 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1970).
96. Lescrynski v. Middlebrook. 260 So. 2d 215 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
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questionable whether such issues in fact exist.9 7 Ordinarily, credibility of
witnesses and quality of the evidence presented in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment are not considered by the trial court at the hearing 98 But
the supreme court noted in Escobar v. Bill Currie Ford, Inc.99 that summary
judgment could conceivably be granted where the evidence in opposition is
"either too incredible to believe or is without probative value even if true."100
Summary judgment will also withstand attack where the opposing party's
evidence requires a pyramiding of inferences.101
Inherent in any appeal from summary judgment is the irreconcilable conflict between the presumption in favor of the correctness of the trial court's
decision and the requirement that the reviewing court draw every possible
inference in favor of the party against whom the motion is made. 0

2

The

03

corollary to this rule is that the movant's papers be read strictly. The statistics strongly suggest that movants should not rely on the presumption in
favor of the trial court's decision. The impression that emerges from the data
might be described as an a posteriori presumption against the correctness of
the ruling of the lower court. 04 It appears, therefore, that when the appellate
courts state that summary judgments are an extreme form of relief they mean
to be taken literally. The extreme independence exhibited by courts reviewing summary judgments is illustrated in Graff Enterprises v. Canal Insurance
Co., 05 wherein the court found it could not concur with the reasoning on
which the trial court relied in granting summary judgment, but nonetheless
affirmed on separate grounds. 08 Notwithstanding the trepidation with which
appellate courts view summary judgments, they will not indulge inferences
in favor of the opposing party when he attempts to raise new issues in opposi07
tion for the first time on appeal.

97. Cf. Tucker v. American Employers Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 221, 223 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969)
(Walden, C.J., dissenting); Lab v. Hall, 200 So. 2d 556, 559 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
98. Tucker v. American Employers Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 221, 223 (4th D.C.A. Fla.), appeal
dismissed, 227 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1969).
99. 247 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1971) (dictum).
100. Id. at 315, citing Johnson v. Studstill, 71 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1954). It is not clear why
the court inserted this dictum in its opinion; it is clearly contrary to the weight of authority.
Industrial Sales & Serv. Corp. v. Duval Motors, Inc., 245 So. 2d 891 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971); see
Massey & Klock, supra note 2, at 547; Massey & Bridges, Civil Procedure, Eighth Survey of
FloridaLaw, 22 U. MiAaM L. REv. 495,498 (1968).
101. Byrd v. Leach, 226 So. 2d 866, 868 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
102. First Realty Corp. v. Standard Steel Treating Co., 268 So. 2d 410, 413 (4th D.CA4
Fla. 1972) (Mager, J., dissenting).
103. 191 So. 2d at 46 (dictum).
104. See Appendix.
105. 213 So. 2d 738 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
106. Id. at 740. Ordinarily in review of summary judgment, the court will frame the
question simply in terms of whether the trial court correctly found the nonexistence of
genuine issues of material fact, and affirm or reverse accordingly.
107. Jones v. Life Ins. Co., 215 So. 2d 889 (3d D.C.A. 1968), cert. denied, 225 So. 2d 539
(Fla. 1969).
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Timing Problems
Because the purposes of the summary judgment require flexibility, the motion can be made at virtually any pretrial stage of the action.108 In this respect
motions for summary judgment differ from the pleadings, responsive motions,
motions for judgment on the pleadings, or motions for directed verdict, all of
which are limited to fixed stages of the litigation. Summary judgment is therefore potentially available at any point before trial. As a result, courts are often
faced with the question of whether summary judgment has been entered prematurely. Although the rule appears to contemplate a fairly complete record, 10 9
the elastic provisions of subsections (a) and (b) permit submission of the motion early in the pleading stages," 0 so that when the motion is utilized in accordance with these provisions it serves as little more than a motion to dismiss
2
and has the same procedural effect."' In Watier v. Rew Crane Service, Inc.,"
for example, the court held per curiam that although the summary judgment
appealed from was properly entered, opportunity should have been afforded
plaintiff to amend her complaint, and such authorization could have been included in the order granting summary judgment." 3 On the other hand, when
utilized after the discovery stage at the other end of the procedural continuum,
the motion when granted may be dispositive of at least some aspects of the
case." 4 In such an instance, use of the summary judgment approximates the
effect of a directed verdict. The general trend of decisions disfavors summary
judgments rendered in the early stages of litigation," 5 and insists both on
hearings on the motion n- and on liberal treatment of motions for rehearing.'"'
It appears that the very flexibility of the motion for summary judgment, in
terms of timing, makes it a disruptive and delaying factor when entered pre108. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a)-(b).
109. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c) permits rendition of summary judgment if "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits if
any" indicate movant has met this dual burden.
110. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a) provides in essence that a claimant may move for summary
judgment "after the expiration of twenty days from the commencement of the action." FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.510(b) allows a paity against whom a claim is asserted to move for summary
judgment "at any time."
111. Cf. Sea Shore Motel Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 233 So. 2d 651 (4th D.C.A.
Fla. 1970) (where summary judgment is proper but it appears that opposing party may have
a cause of action if properly pleaded, and the proper procedure is to grant summary judgment with leave to amend).
112. 240 So. 2d 177 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
113. Id. at 179. Judge Owens, concurring specially, thought the court did not need to
go so far to reach the result it did, and could have rested on the theory that defendantmovants failed to demonstrate that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
114. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
115. Lovelace v. Sobrino, 280 So. 2d 514 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973); see Smith v. Continental
Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 393 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973). See generally Tyner v. Woodruff, 206 So. 2d
684 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (supporting proofs for plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
held insufficient to overcome every theory on which defendant's position could be maintained).
116. Lovelace v. Sobrino, 280 So. 2d 514 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
117. Cf. Anderson v. Aamco Transmissions of Brevard, Inc., 265 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1972).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss3/3

14

Hyde: The Procedural Mirage: Post-Hall Summary Judgement Law in Florida
1975]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT LAW IN FLORIDA

maturely, in much the same manner as a motion to dismiss. This explains its
attractiveness to some litigants, as well as the disfavor in which it is held by
reviewing courts.
"Right to Trial"
In reversing summary judgments Florida appellate courts commonly express
solicitude for litigants' rights to jury trial."Is But right to trial is not legal
justification for denying summary judgment, inasmuch as that right comes into
being only when a genuine issue of material fact exists between the parties."The courts in recent years have used a variety of means to circumvent this
point in order to assist litigants in getting to trial. Examples are: (1) emphasizing the burden on movant; 120 (2) minimizing the burden on the opposing
party;' 2 1 (3) invoking the difference between the determination of the existence
of factual issues and the adjudication of those issues; 22 and (4) expressing
preference for directed verdicts at trial after plaintiff has had the opportunity
to present factual issues fully to the trier of fact. 23 Only when opposing parties
"sit idly by" and do nothing, or when absolutely no evidence exists to support
the opposing party's cause of action or defense, 124 does the courts' solicitude
for the right to trial appear to wane.
Ta NDs IN CLASsES OF ACIONS

As might be expected, the highest rates of reversal of summary judgments
occur in negligence and medical malpractice actions. 125 "Success" (that is,
affirmance) is somewhat, but not significantly, more likely in actions arising
ex contractu, creditors' actions and non-negligence tort claims, and miscellaneous actions pertaining to the title, possession and use of real and personal
property. 2 6 Given the caveat that summary judgments are to be entered with
great caution in negligence cases, 27 however, it is surprising that the wide

118. E.g., Stephens v. Dichtenmueller, 216 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. 1968); Page v. Staley,
226 So. 2d 129, 132 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Stephens v. Moody, 225 So. 2d 586, 588 (Ist
D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
119. The Florida supreme court has held that summary judgment does not infringe on
the constitutional right to jury trial. See Williams v. City of Lake City, 62 So. 2d 732 (Fla.
1953). But see Escobar v. Bill Currie Ford, Inc., 247 So. 2d 311, 315 (Fla. 1971), where the
court observed in dictum that "[t]he summary judgment procedure is limited else the opposing party loses his constitutional right to trial."
120. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
121. Byrd v. Leach, 226 So. 2d 866, 868 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
122. Ham v. Heintzelman's Ford, Inc., 256 So. 2d 264, 267 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971). See
text accompanying notes 108-117 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 73-93 supra.
124. 226 So. 2d at 868.
125. Negligence: 88.5%; malpractice: 87.5%. See Appendix.
126. The reversal rates in these classes of cases range from 76.0% to 83.3%. See Appendix.
127. Stephens v. Moody, 225 So. 2d 586 (1st DCA, Fla, 1969); Maury v. City Stores Co.,
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disparity in reversal percentages (a difference of 12.5 per cent between negligence actions and "other" actions - primarily creditor actions and non-negligence tort claims)128 is not greater. It is also notable that, although the sum-

mary judgment was originally conceived as a procedural aid for plaintiffs,it is now used more than twice as often by defendants,so with only slightly
3
less success.1 '

Summary judgments are attempted most often in the cases arising ex
contractu and in negligence actions, 132 and some trends in summary judgment
law unique to each of these broad classes of actions are therefore discernible.13
Negligence and Medical Malpractice
Despite the appellate courts' reiteration that ordinarily the jury should
decide negligence questions,34 counsel and trial courts stubbornly persist in
attempting to utilize summary judgment. 35 The extraordinary burden placed
on movant" 36 - nearly always defendant in negligence actions 3 7 - renders the
movant's task nearly impossible; the "possible" existence of inferences giving

214 So. 2d 776 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Jones v. Crews, 204 So. 2d 24 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967);
Dutton v. Ryder's Motel, Inc., 200 So. 2d 823 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
128. Percentage of negligence reversals (88.5%) minus "other" reversals (76.0%) equals
12.5%. See Appendix.
129. See note 2 supra.
130. In the 421 cases studied, defendants moved for summary judgment in 293 cases,
plaintiffs in 128. See Appendix, table 2.
131. Defendants were reversed on appeal in 82.6% of the total cases while plaintiffs
were reversed in 76.5% of the cases, a difference of 6.1%. See Appendix, table 2.
132. Of the 421 decisions studied by the author, nearly 75% of them (300) fell into one
of these two broad categories. See Appendix, table 1.
133. The malpractice cases will be considered with the negligence cases. The other two
classes of cases, miscellaneous cases pertaining to real and personal property, and miscellaneous creditor and intentional tort actions, were relatively small and so internally varied
as to make identification of trends unique to those classes of cases unfeasible. The two
major classes of cases, by comparison, were sufficiently large and homogeneous to facilitate
analysis and conclusion about certain basic aspects of the state of summary judgment law in
each class.
134. See cases cited note 127 supra.
135. See Appendix. The motivation for counsel in seeking summary judgment in these
cases is clear enough; usually the movant is defendant who wants to avoid the jury. The
reasons why trial courts persist in granting summary judgments in negligence actions is not
clear, and certainly cannot be attributed to any single factor. Among the possible motivations are a desire to lessen the trial docket and perhaps a desire to force plaintiffs into
accumulating more "hard" evidence to justify taking the case to trial. Of course, there
doubtless are instances where the trial court is convinced defendant has met his twofold
burden under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
136. In Byrd v. Leach, 226 So. 2d 866 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968), the court flatly stated
summary judgment is appropriate when no evidence of negligence is present. It is inferable
from the court's assertion that this is the only- situation in which summary judgment is
permissible in a negligence action.
137. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966). Of the 123 negligence cases examined in
this study, defendant was movant in 116. See Appendix.
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rise to genuine issues of material fact presents an imposing barrier.'3 Moreover, in reviewing summary judgments in negligence actions, courts will often
strain to find possible inferences in favor of opposing parties.1 9
In terms of the basic principles of negligence theory, reviewing courts look
for an utter absence of linkage between defendant-movant and proximate cause
and usually do not find it. 140 For the purposes of withstanding a motion for
summary judgment, plaintiff need not establish defendant's duty in detail's'
because the courts in fact are willing to imply the obligation.142 Thus, close
scrutiny by the courts usually results in a finding that defendant has failed to
foreclose the possibility of genuine issues of material fact43
In Glisson v. North Florida Telephone Co.,144 a slip-and-fall case, the trial
court granted defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the
verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Because "a new
trial on the same evidence would be a useless gesture,"' 45 the court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment. The district court of appeal, pointing out that trial courts have much broader discretion in granting a new trial
than in granting summary judgment, reversed on the ground that the defendant had not met its Holl burden of demonstrating conclusively the nonexistence of genuine issues of material fact. The district court's previous affirmance of the new trial order "did not mean that there was no evidence
introduced before the jury in support of plaintiffs' case."'' 6 In short, the fact
that plaintiffs had not adduced, sufficient evidence to prove their negligence
claim was insufficient in itself to justify summary judgment for defendants.
Another case, Lindsey v .SeaboardCoastline Railroad Co., 47 is an exception
to appellate courts' adherence to this strict approach in negligence actions.
Here, instead of framing the question in terms of whether the defendant had
met its burden of proving the nonexistence of genuine issues of material fact
on the question of negligence, the court stated the issue as whether plaintiff
had met her "burden" of proving the existence of genuine issues.148 Given this
approach, it is hardly surprising that the court found that plaintiff failed to
meet her burden and affirmed the summary judgment for the defendant.149

138. Williams v. Florida Realty & Management Co., 272 So. 2d 176 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973);
see Anderson v. Aamco Transmissions of Brevard, Inc., 265 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1972).
139. Cf. Lab v. Hall, 200 So. 2d 556, 559 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
140. Thomas v. Atlantic Associates, Inc., 226 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1969); Byrd v. Leach, 226
So. 2d 866 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Grove v. Sanford Mobile Park, Inc., 212 So. 2d 37 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
141. Grove v. Sanford Mobile Park, Inc., 212 So. 2d 37 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
142. Id.
143. Butler v. Porter-Russell Corp., 217 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1968).
144. 210 So. 2d 25 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
145. Id. at 26.
146. Id. at 27.

147. 248 So. 2d 518 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
148. Id.
149. An illustration of what happens when the court takes the approach opposite to
that taken in Lindsey- focusing on whether the movant has met his burden will be found
in the factually similamr case, of Mackey v, Arnold, 242 So.. 2d 754 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971)
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It is difficult to predict the impact of the adoption of the comparative negligence rule on the use of the motion for summary judgment in negligence
actions, but it seems probable that it will have some deterrent effect. 50 It appears, however, that current law will remain valid vis-a-vis defendants who
seek to avoid liability altogether.
In the specialized area of medical malpractice, Holl and Visingardi have
virtually closed the door to defendants seeking summary judgment.' 5' The
percentage reversal rate (87.5 per cent) is probably misleading because summary judgment is rarely granted in these cases; the rate would likely be higher
if more cases were appealed. While the Hol court set forth several thoretical
circumstances in which a malpractice defendant might obtain affirmable summary judgment,' 52 in practice the defense must be able to prove the absence of
negligence by an evidentiary standard approaching the level of "clear and
convincing." In Rosen v. Parkway General Hospital, Inc. 5 3 the only recent

medical malpractice case found in which summary judgment for defendants
was affirmed, defendants were able to prevail because they demonstrated that
the patient who died in the wrongful death action had been injured so badly
it was impossible to save her.1 5 4 Even when given factual situations that appear
eminently amenable to summary judgment, however, courts are loathe to approve it in this class of cases. 155
Actions Arising Ex Contractu
Summary judgments have a better chance of ultimate success in the broad
class of actions arising ex contractu, which includes actions involving insurance, actions on notes, and landlord-tenant cases. 156 But even in these cases,
which so often revolve around written instruments and thus are more amenable to findings that only questions of law exist, 5 7 the courts reviewing sum-

(summary judgment for defendant reversed). The preferable approach is set forth in
K. HUGHES, supra note 78, §23.
150. Because the culpability for injuries and death caused by negligence can now be
apportioned using comparative negligence theory, movants for summary judgments will face
the almost insurmountable burden of proving no negligence whatever in order to prevail.
With contributory negligence no longer an absolute bar to recovery, it seems logical to
predict that courts will be much less amenable to granting summary judgment in this class

of cases.
151. In the approximately seven years of summary judgment case law studied by the
author, only eight malpractice decisions were found. See Appendix.
152. The Holl court pointed out that movant can succeed by (1) showing conclusively
he is not guilty of the negligence charged against him, (2) showing conclusively that the
alleged negligence was not related to plaintiff's injury, or (3) showing conclusively that
plaintiff is completely unable to present proof of the alleged negligence. 191 So. 2d at 47-48.
153. 265 So. 2d 93 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).

154. Id.
155. Cf. Lab v. Hall, 200 So. 2d 556 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
156. The reversal rate is 77A% compared with 88.5% in negligence cases. See Appendix, table 1.
157. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. In-Sink-Erator, 252 So. 2d 856, 858 (4th D.C.A. Fla.
1971); Shafer & Miller v. Miami Heart Institute, 237 So. 2d 310 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
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mary judgment have indicated a willingness to go beyond the four corners of
the writing if there is any indication of a genuine issue of material fact surrounding execution. Summary judgments on matters such as modification of
written contracts and disputes concerning interpretation or mistake 58 are carefully examined by reviewing courts to determine whether the trial court
actually made findings of disputed fact in reaching its conclusion about the
"questions of law."' 59 The same close scrutiny pertains where, when per16
formance is claimed by the movant, questions of agency1 60 and delivery arise.
Reversal is likely when it appears the trial court based its decision (at least in
part) on the admissibility or probative value of documents appended to affidavits in opposition to the motion.1 62 The assertion of affirmative defenses in
opposition to the motion renders affirmance unlikely if accompanied by af163
fidavits that set forth the possibility of evidentiary support.
The largest single subgroup in the broad category of control actions is the
insurance case in which the insured attempts to recover from the insurer under
any of a wide variety of policies. Generally, mere denial of coverage in the
insurer-movant's supporting affidavit has been held insufficient to foreclose the
existence of any genuine issues of material fact.16 4 Reversal occurs, too, where
the appellate court finds the trial court has made findings of fact with reference to the terms of the policy in question.165 Because the issue of coverage
involves a linkage of the facts with the policy provisions, the courts usually
find a genuine issue of material fact, which they occasionally spell out on
remand. 66
FUNCTIONS OF COURTS AND COUNSEL
Appellate Courts
The function of the appellate courts in the summary judgment process is
to frame, clarify, and explicate the provisions and limitations of rule 1.510(c)
and, in the context of reviewing cases, to delineate the situational boundaries
within which it will be permitted. Most importantly, the appellate courts'
158. Wagner v. Bonucelli, 239 So. 2d 619 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Charles Taylor Marine,
Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 234 So. 2d 400 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
159. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Pinellas County, 214 So. 2d 58 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Glens
Falls Ins. Co. v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 213 So. 2d 741 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
160. Herold v. Computer Components Int'l, Inc., 252 So. 2d 576 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1971).
161. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. In-Sink-Erator, 252 So. 2d 856 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
162. Ham v. Heintzelman's Ford, Inc., 256 So. 2d 264 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
163. Coquina Ridge Properties v. East West Co., 255 So. 2d 279 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
164. Stringfellow v. State Farm Fire 9- Cas. Co., 295 So. 2d 686 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
Conversely, in Old Equity Life Ins. Co. v. Suggs, 263 So. 2d 280 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972), judgment for the insured was reversed where the insurer had responded to plaintiff's "Request
for Admissions" with blanket denials, because the "Request" was for an admission as to a
legal conclusion and not simply as to a fact.
165. Tatman v. American Heritage Life Ins. Co., 215 So. 2d 11 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
166. An excellent example of this will be found in Knight v. American Heritage Life Ins.
Co., 237 So. 2d 224 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1970), quoted in pertinent part in the text accompanying
note 204 infra.
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chief function in summary adjudication is to provide workable guidelines for
trial courts and counsel.
The general disfavor in which appellate courts hold summary judgments is
obvious from the statistics- 7 as well as from the pronouncements of the courts
themselves.168 It often surfaces in close cases where the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact is doubtful;169 in such instances the courts draw the
"issues" sufficiently broadly or vaguely to justify their finding that a genuine
issue of material fact remains unresolved.170 On occasion, possibly influenced
by the equities of the case, the courts appear to reach to find a genuine issue
in the face of a strong case in favor of summary judgment.Y71 In other cases,
however, the appellate courts will pinpoint for counsel and trial court the
17 2
precise finding of fact on which reversal is predicated.
The reviewing courts' treatment of the facts from which the genuine issues
ostensibly emerge in any given case varies from detailed exposition 17 3 to no
particulars of the case at all.174 Likewise, in discussing concurrence or disagreement with the trial court's decision, the appellate courts in some cases set
forth the unresolved issues in detail. In other cases they simply register agreement or disagreement with the trial court without setting forth their reasons.
For example, in Bell v. Gray,175 a case affirming summary judgment for defendant in a negligence action, the court declined the opportunity to give trial
courts and counsel an idea of the standards to be met in seeking summary
judgment in such actions and contented itself with agreement with the trial
court's assessment of the evidence. Nevertheless, concise statements of the operative facts and unresolved justiciable issues of fact do not seem beyond
reach1 76 and would provide helpful guidance to courts and counsel in avoiding frivolous use of the device. It seems clear that the present confusion and
high reversal rate in summary judgment law is due in part to the widely varying and inconsistent treatment of such cases by Florida appellate courts.
The appellate courts periodically indicate a desire for trial courts to set
forth the grounds on which summary judgments are based,1 77 although this
practice is not required by the rule.178 If the trial court's findings require any
167. See Appendix.
168. E.g., Stephens v. Dichtenmueller, 216 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1968); Holl v. Talcott, 191
So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
169. See Tucker v. American Employers Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 221 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969);
Lab v. Hall, 200 So. 2d 556 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
170. See Tucker v. American Employers Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 221 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969);
Lab v. Hall, 200 So. 2d 556 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
171. Wagner v. Bonucelli, 239 So. 2d 619 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
172. Gentile v. Abadessa, 267 So. 2d 344 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
173. Egan v. Washington Gen. Ins. Corp., 240 So. 2d 875 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Schollenberger v. Baskin, 227 So. 2d 79 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
174. E.g., Claudio v. Miami Aerospace Academy, Inc., 291 So. 2d 72 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974);
Dilallo v. WVinn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 267 So. 2d 843 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
175. 220 So. 2d 446 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
176. See, e.g., Gentile v. Abadessa, 267 So. 2d 344 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
177. E.g., Tatman v. American Heritage Life Ins. Co., 215 So. 2d 11 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968);
Tyner v. Woodruff, 206 So. 2d 684 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
178. FL.A. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c) is explicit as to the record materials to be submitted to the
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inferences in favor of movant, reversal is assured. In any event, it appears that
appellate courts, perhaps subconsciously, are somewhat more receptive to summary judgments where the record on appeal is full and accompanied by the
trial court's opinion." 9 Finally, reviewing courts exhibit sensitivity to instances
where it is even possible that the trial court may have based its decision on the
credibility of witnesses or the probative value of the evidence. s0 Such cases also
result in reversal.
Trial Courts
One of the failings of trial courts is the frequent omission, in the judgment
itself, of the grounds on which its decision to grant summary judgment is
based."8 When this occurs the appellate court is left to speculate on the basis
for the action of the trial court, and the judgment is put in jeopardy.
In some instances rendition of summary judgment is proper because of defective pleadings; here the, appellate courts indicate the proper action for trial
courts is to include in the order granting summary judgment authorization for
the opposing party to amend. 8 2 In one case, however, it was held that because
plaintiff had not introduced evidence that he had misstated his position, it was
proper for the trial court to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment
without granting plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.8 3
Given the flexibility of the timing provisions of the rule, 8 4 the trial court
could conceivably grant summary judgment before the pleading stage is complete. Success in this instance is unlikely, however, especially when no hearing
18
on defensive motions has been held, 8 5 the answer has not been filed, 6 or
87
where-discovery is incomplete.2
Technical deficiencies in opposing affidavits, without more, are generally
held by the appellate courts to be insufficient justification for the entry of
summary judgment. 88 The preferred procedure is to allow the opposing party
to cure the shortcomings by amendment if possible. Likewise, where a witness
in an action makes a subsequent inconsistent statement in an opposing affidavit, it has been held that the proper procedure for the trial court is to retrial court for its decision on the motion, and §1.510(d) requires the trial court to make an
order specifying nondisputed facts in instances where summary judgment is dispositive as to
some of the issues of the case. The rule is silent as to requirements for a record for appeal.
179. See text accompanying notes 109-118 supra.
180. Tucker v. American Employers Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 221 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
181. Mowery v. First Nat'l Bank, 228 So. 2d 298 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Newman v.

Shore, 206 So. 2d 279, 280 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Watier v. Rew Crane Serv., Inc., 240 So. 2d 177, 179 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
Bernard Marko &Associates, Inc. v. Steele, 230 So. 2d 42, 44 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.510(a)-(b); see text accompanying notes 108-117 supra.
Lovelace v. Sobrino, 280 So. 2d 514 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
Madison v. Haynes, 220 So. 2d 44 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
Lovelace v. Sobrino, 280 So. 2d 514 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
See Stephens v. Dichtenmueller, 216 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1968); Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.

2d 40 (Fla. 1966). A succinct summary of the subject of suffidency of affidavits will be found
in Massey &Klock, supra note 2, at 549-51.
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quire evidence through discovery and a further motion for summary judgment,
rather than entering judgment outright. 8 9
Both the statistics and a study of the cases themselves indicate that the
attitude of trial courts toward summary judgments differs markedly from that
of appellate courts. Certainly the existence of heavily-laden trial dockets would
explain trial courts' willingness to settle cases through the expeditious mode
of summary adjudication. The trial courts are understandably influenced as
well by the amenability of both parties to the procedure. 190 Whatever the
reasons for this disparate approach, the trial courts are unquestionably the key
figures in the summary judgment process and thus are primarily responsible
for the current problems in Florida summary judgment law. 91
Counsel
In J.M. Fields, Inc. v. Lenz, 19 - an indemnity dispute between defendants
wherein summary judgment for one defendant was reversed, the court observed that an extended explanation of its decision was unnecessary because
"it is apparent from the arguments and briefs that both parties are acquainted
with summary judgment law.''93 The statistical evidence, 9 4 however, suggests
that in most cases quite the reverse may be true. Indeed, the reviewing courts
occasionally scold opposing counsel for failing to take proper measures when
19
confronted by a motion for summary judgment. 5
Among common failures of opposing counsel at the trial court level is the
failure to submit affidavits or depositions in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 96 Even in negligence actions, where the likelihood of denial
or reversal is high, reliance on the "slightest doubt" rule alone may not be
sufficient to defeat the motion. 1 97 Failure of opposing counsel simply to request more time to accumulate evidence in opposition 98 can result in entry
of summary judgment.' 99 The outcome is the same when counsel submits a
189. Andrews v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 So. 2d 136, 137 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
190. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
191. Certainly counsel and appellate courts have contributed to the current state of
affairs, but it is apparent that trial courts are in the best position to control the use of the
summary judgment. The undisciplined use of the device, evidenced by the numerous cases
(and reversals) indicated in the Appendix, can be stemmed by rigorous scrutiny of summary
judgment motions at the trial court level.
192. 257 So. 2d 305 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
193. Id. at 306.
194. See Appendix.
195. See Byrd v. Leach, 226 So. 2d 866, 868 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
196. Id.
197. Id. See Lindsey v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 248 So. 2d 518 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
198. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(f) is available for this purpose: "If it appears from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just."
199. Byrd v. Leach, 226 So. 2d 866 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969); cf. Smith v. Continental Ins.
Co., 281 So. 2d 393 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
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deposition in opposition after judgment has been entered and after denial of
a motion for rehearing.200 The general rule prohibiting the raising of new de201
It is
fenses on appeal applies to appeals from summary judgments as well.
incumbent on opposing counsel to base his attack on the motion on pleaded
defenses or causes of action; affirmance is the sanction.
In examining appellate opinions that delineate unresolved issues of fact,
the reader is struck by the failure of opposing counsel either to recognize the
issues or to convince the trial court of their validity.20 2 A vivid illustration of
the point is Knight v. American Heritage Life Insurance Co, 203 a disability
insurance policy dispute in which a final summary judgment was reversed and
remanded with directions. After reciting the prerequisites for summary judgment the First District Court of Appeal catalogued the issues that apparently
escaped the attention of opposing counsel:
There existed genuine issues as to several material facts, including
issues as to whether the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled;
whether the defendant was timely notified of the plaintiff's claim and,
if not, whether the defendant, by its actions, waived formal notification
and formal proofs; whether the facts shown create an estoppel or waiver
on the defendant's part; whether the plaintiff used due diligence, or did
the defendant have actual or constructive knowledge of the plaintiff's
claim; whether the defendant is estopped from denying policy coverage
if its claim agent had the confidence and trust of the illiterate insured,
the plaintiff, and what
damages, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to in the
20 4
light of the evidence.
The plethora of summary judgment cases in recent years suggests that the
motion is employed by moving counsel almost reflexively, in a manner akin
to moving for a directed verdict at trial. While counsel cannot be faulted for
attempting the fastest possible adjudication of a client's interest, the question
arises whether the "reflexive" motion for summary judgment ultimately gains
the client anything. In 81.2 per cent of appealed summary judgments in the
body of recent Florida case law the granting of the motion for summary judgment merely represented postponement of the cause to the trier of fact and
added cost and delay to the client.
Suggestions for Counsel
The infinite variety of summary judgment cases, with their attendant inconsistencies and conflicts, precludes formulation of any ironclad rules for
counsel to consider in determining whether and how to move for or oppose a
motion for summary judgment. Some helpful suggestions do emerge, however,
from the preceding analysis.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Lane v. Haskoe, 200 So. 2d 268 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1967).
Jones v. Life Ins. Co., 215 So. 2d 889 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
See Byrd v. Leach, 226 So. 2d 866 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1969).
237 So. 2d 224 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1970).
Id. at 225.
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In view of the statistics, moving counsel should realistically assess his
chances for success on appeal. Even though the motion be made solely for the
purpose of delay, the ultimate result in terms of the client's interest may be
no different than if the cause proceeded directly to settlement or trial.205
Obviously, consideration of the type of action involved is important; in negligence or malpractice actions, for example, the likelihood of a movant's success on appeal will be conditioned on conclusive demonstration of absence of
2 06
duty and proximate cause.
Moving counsel should remember, too, that his evidentiary burden will be
greater than that on a plaintiff at trial. In many instances the moving party
may have more proof available to it concerning the validity of its cause of
action or defense than does the nonmoving party. 20 7 For this reason, reviewing
courts will be inclined to reverse on the "slightest doubt" rationale or a finding of prematurity. An exhaustive search for all possible issues that could
emerge from the facts will also provide an indicator of the likelihood of affirmance. 20 8 To put it another way, counsel should adopt the perspective of the
reviewing court in scrutinizing the factual picture for genuine issues of material fact. At the same time, moving counsel should resist the temptation to
take the evidentiary weaknesses of the opponent's case or the credibility of its
witnesses into account. Finally, timing is an important consideration. The
attractive flexibility of the timing provision notwithstanding, the chances for
affirmance are reduced where summary judgment is rendered prior to conclusion of the pleading or discovery stages.
Opposing counsel's task is made easier by the disfavor in which appellate
courts hold summary judgments, as well as by the considerable burden on
moving counsel. This does not mean, however, that token or minimal opposition will insure denial at the trial court or reversal on appeal, especially as
there are numerous weapons of attack in opposing counsel's arsenal. First,
motions for rehearing should be pursued vigorously; ample case law, led by
Holl, provides that such motions should be entertained liberally by trial
courts. 20 9 Next, the apparently little-used section (f) of rule 1.510 provides that
the court may refuse the application for judgment or order a continuance if
opposing counsel shows present inability to "present by affidavit facts essential
to justify his opposition.."210 More extensive use of this rule would in many
instances reduce the likelihood of premature entry of summary judgment as
205. See Talcott v. Holl, 224 So. 2d 420 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). While it may seem
heretical to suggest that counsel entertain the possibility of not using a procedural device in
a client's interest, it is apparent that in the special case of summary judgments, abstention
would be less heretical than honest. If foregoing a motion for summary judgment-in the
average case where ultimate failure is likely- reduces the cost and delay to the client, counsel
can hardly be said to have not properly advanced his client's cause of action or defense. Even
though many counsel employ the motion almost automatically, a motion for summary judgment is certainly not obligatory.
206. See text accompanying notes 64-107 supra.
207. E.g., Smith v. Continental Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 393 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
208. See text accompanying notes 202-204 supra.
209. 191 So. 2d at 46-47; see Summary Judgment, supra note 4, §19.20.
210.

FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(f).
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well as the cost and delay of appellate litigation. Similarly, at the hearing on
the motion, arguments on the question of prematurity can be persuasive. If
the opposing party has not had the opportunity to perfect his pleadings and
complete discovery, he should be able to persuade the trial court that, -given
the opportunity, he will be able to' meet the burden that has' :shifted" tohim. 211 In instances where it is apparent that the moving party has met the
dual requirementof rule 1.5 10(c), opposing counsel generally risks entry of an
212
order granting summary judgment by simply asserting naked denial or claim.
While reviewing courts do not insist that the opposing party prove its entire
case at the hearing on the motion, opposing counsel should be prepared to
show, through the introduction of affidavits, depositions, and other documents
that he will be able to adduce, at trial, evidence that will at least raise the
possibility of a genuine issue of material fact. The recent cases suggest that
this threshold requirement is rather easily attainable if counsel will make
bona fide efforts to oppose entry of summary judgment.
CONCLUSION

The statistics dramatically demonstrate that the use of the summary judgment device in Florida is producing the opposite of the intended effect. Instead of reducing delay and cost in an overwhelming majority of cases in
which it is employed, it produces additional expense and prolongs unnecessarily the final disposition of the interests of litigaits. It would be an exaggeration to conclude that counsel and trial courts are abusing the device, but
it is dear that great care and caution are needed at the trial court level to
restore the integrity of the procedure. Disciplined use and consideration of the
motion for summary judgment by counsel and courts, respectively, would reduce the number of summary judgments reversed on appeal. Counsel and
courts employing the device must always keep in mind that the leading cases
in recent Florida summary judgment law arose in medical malpractice actions
and thus impose more stringent restrictions on the use of the motion than
might otherwise be the case.
It would also be helpful to incorporate into rule 1.510(c) the judiciallyengrafted requirements that the movant conclusively "show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material ultimate fact" or to any infrences arising
therefrom. This change would not add to existing law, but it could serve to
remind both trial courts and counsel that the summary judgment is an extreme
form of relief ordinarily not available for the final disposition of a cause.
A reduction in the number of motions for summary judgment would probably have little effect in increasing the case load of trial courts because most
summary judgments are reversed and proceed on to trial or settlement anyway.
Such a reduction would, however, reduce the load of appellate litigation.
Moreover, a decline in the number of appeals from summary judgments would
in all likelihood reduce the "statistical presumption" of invalidity that now
211. Cf. Watier v. Rew Crane Serv., Inc., 240 So. 2d 177 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Sea
Shore Motel Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 233 So. 2d 651 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
212. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
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characterizes them. It is reasonable to expect that faced with fewer appeals
from summary judgment, appellate courts would place more faith in trial
court results than they do now. Perhaps most importantly, such a reduction
would insure that parties with bona fide grounds for summary judgment will
receive the expeditious adjudication they merit.
ROBERT

T.

HYDE, JR.

APPENDIX
(A tabular summary of the statistical results of a collection and study of 421 Florida summary judgment decisions rendered between 1967 and 1974, covering volumes 200 through 294,
Southern Reporter, second series).
Table 1
PERCENTAGE REVERSALS BY MAJOR CLASSES OF CASES

Class of

No. Cases Summary No. Cases Summary
Judgment Granted Judgment Affirmed
and Reversed'
(outright)2

Cases

Total No.
of Cases

Ex Contractu 3

177

137

40

77.4

Negligence

123

109

14

88.5

8

7

1

87.5

Miscellaneous
Property5

42

35

7

83.3

Other

71

54

9

76.0

Total

421

342

71

812

Medical
Malpractice4

Percentage
Reversal

1. This figure also includes a small number of cases wherein summary judgment was
denied, and upheld on appeal.
2. Multiple decisions - partial affirmances and reversals - account for the failure of the
figures to balance. See note 9 supra.
3. This class includes ordinary contract actions, insurance cases and landlord-tenant
actions.
4. The relatively very small size of this class, which easily could have been included in
the negligence data, points rather dramatically to the statistically disproportionate influence
of Holl in recent summary judgment law in Florida.
5. This class includes all actions concerning title, possession, and use of real and personal
property, other than landlord-tenant cases.
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